Solon the Thinker: Political Thought in Archaic Athens. By JOHN LEWIS. 
London: Duckworth, 2008. Pp. ix + 178. Paper, $29.95. ISBN 
0–7156–3456–9.

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Lewis (L.) defines the purpose of this study of Solon’s extant poems as 
an examination of early Greek political thought and the position Solon had 
in the development of political ideas in Archaic Athens. In this approach 
L. is concerned more with Solon’s ideas than with his poetic ability or 
any actual political changes he brought about in Athens. As he states (p. 
2): “Solon is not an extension of a genre—he is a person in his own 
right, with a distinct point of view, who should be read as such.” Of 
course, L. admits that it is impossible to arrange the fragments in any 
chronological order, since the historical setting for the poems is lost. 
Nor does L. believe that we should rely on later writers for our 
understanding of Solon’s thoughts, although he reverts at several points 
to the interpretations of the ancient authors who cited individual 
fragments and the use to which they put them. For example, L. argues (p. 
91) that it is impossible to distinguish Solon’s meaning in frr. 16 and 
17 from Clement’s Christian purpose for citing them. While primarily 
concerned with Solon’s ideas, L. nonetheless draws upon the writings of 
other Archaic authors, such as Hesiod, to clarify further Solon’s views 
on a subject, either showing his similarity or divergence from them. In 
particular, L.’s examination of Solon’s writings investigates three 
major concepts: dike (justice), moira (fate) and jointly doulosunei and 
eleutheros.

L.’s investigation of Solon’s understanding of dike draws information 
primarily from fr. 4 (The Hymn to the City); he helpfully begins each 
section of his argument by citing the appropriate lines of the poem under 
consideration, providing both the Greek text and his own translation. In 
4.1–4, Solon states that Athens will never be destroyed by the whims of 
Zeus or the plans of Athena; rather its demise will be the result of the 
actions of its citizens. L. points out that in this cosmic view of the 
polis Solon differs greatly from Hesiod, who argued that men work and toil 
by the whims of Zeus. Solon’s removal of the gods as the cause of 
Athenian stasis is very much a precursor to the Sophistic movement in the 
late 5th century. With the removal of the divine, Solon believes that 
Athens’ problems are caused by the misguided judgments of its citizens, 
who are being persuaded by the nous (understanding) of unjust leaders, set 
on wealth and personal gain. Because of the misguided nous of their 
leaders, the people are about to suffer pains from this great hubris, which 
will result in a stasis. Solon makes a similar argument in fr. 6. L. argues 
(p. 42) that at this point in the nous-hubris-stasis progression, “Solon 
… expands on this idea, moving from the unjust assaults of individuals to 
an elevated, even divine sense of dike that brings retribution to the 
entire polis.” Unjust actions spread to the entire polis and afflict all 
the citizens. Because of this effect on the polis, a leader like Solon 
himself must teach the distinctions between and effects of dusnomie 
(lawlessness) and eunomie (lawfulness). After discussing Solon’s 
understanding of these two opposites and their relationship to dike, L. 
concludes that Solon, in his writings, never really states what dike is. 
“He is on the cusp of philosophical understanding, but not yet in its 
camp” (p. 58).

L.’s Chapter 4 is devoted to an analysis of the structure of fr. 4 and 
the connection between its structure and its meaning. In Chapters 5 and 6, 
on the other hand, L. turns to the concept of moira (fate) as defined in 
Solon’s poetry; the focus is on fr. 13 (Hymn to the Muses), in which 
Solon states that moira brings good and evil to mortals. L. notes (p. 74) 
that “Some readers have argued that a division, or split, exists in 
[Solon’s] thought, between his revolutionary view of political matters 
and his traditional view of fate,” and he himself explores the 
possibility that such a split is present. L. states that at the outset of 
any such discussion one must distinguish between ancient and modern 
concepts and remember that Solon did not have a philosophical concept of 
justice. In fr. 13 the polis is not mentioned; rather, the poem begins by 
asking for wealth (olbos) from the gods and renown (doxa) from mortals. 
Both of these are part of a person’s own bios, “…a general term 
denoting a person’s maintenance of life and lifestyle” (p. 77). As 
L.’s discussion of a possible split in Solon’s thinking between 
polis/dike and bios/moira progresses, the problem he sees is that Solon’s 
moira does not distinguish between the just or the unjust, but gives both 
good and evil to either. In this way a good man can suffer evil, while an 
unjust man may be given great rewards; moira thus dispenses good and evil 
in an arbitrary way. In the end, L. concludes (p. 107) that for Solon the 
causal concept of dike and the arbitrary nature of moira do 
“…dichotomize human life into two realms, which cannot be 
reconciled.”

L.’s final chapter is concerned with the concepts of doulosunei and 
eleutheros, and poses the question: “Did Solon have a concept of freedom 
as opposed to being enslaved?” In his poems Solon distinguishes two types 
of enslavement: the enslavement of the polis and the enslavement of the 
earth through the placing of the horoi in Attica. In the first type, Solon 
sees slavery and tyranny as closely connected, and claims that the people 
through hubris have come under the control of a tyrant. There is also 
enslavement from debt that has carried Athenians abroad. Solon notes that 
the enslavement of the polis can be legal or illegal. As to the other type 
of slavery, Solon claims to have brought an end to the enslavement of the 
earth by tearing up the boundary stones (horoi). When he discusses 
eleutheros, it is in the context of setting someone or something free from 
a burden; he does not use the abstract word “freedom” per se. But L. 
believes (p. 121) that Solon did in fact have a concept of “freedom” in 
a political context which was the opposite of “enslavement.”

The paperback edition of Solon, the Thinker: Political Thought in Archaic 
Athens is a rerelease of an earlier work (2006) with some changes; in 
particular L. has included a new appendix of translations of the poems. 
This is a valuable addition, although I would like to have the Greek texts 
included in the appendix, not just scattered throughout the book. A few 
other minor points: L. often mentions Solon’s audience, but does not 
specify who that audience is. This is of some importance since the 
disposition of the audience may affect the contents of a poem. Nor does L. 
state how the poems were delivered: read aloud in a poetic contest, as 
Hesiod’s poems were, or performed in private gatherings like a symposium? 
Overall, however, the study is stimulating and provides new insights not 
only to Solon’s thinking but also the general state of political thought 
in Archaic Athens, and the bibliography is very useful.

PHILLIP V. STANLEY
San Francisco State University


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