Ancient Supplication. By F.S. NAIDEN. Oxford and New York: Oxford 

University Press, 2006. Pp. xiv + 426. Cloth, $74.00. ISBN 0–19–518341–X.



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This is the first book to examine all the sources concerning supplication 

in classical antiquity, both Greek and Roman (with occasional reference to 

Hebrew and other Near Eastern traditions), from Homer down through the 

Roman empire (with a brief coda on Christian attitudes). On the basis of a 

thorough review of the evidence, informed by a mastery of the primary and 

secondary literature, Naiden (N.) proposes a four-step model of the 

supplication process, and with it a new interpretation of how supplication 

works. In brief, N. rejects the prevailing view, according to which the 

supplicandus is bound to accept a suppliant’s plea if it is made in the 

proper ritual fashion, failure to do so being a violation of customary 

norms (the position, roughly, of John Gould). On the contrary, N. argues 

that the supplicandus is always free to accept or reject the request, and 

this decision constitutes the essential fourth stage of the process. N. 

denies too that successful supplication necessarily means that the 

supplicant is accepted into the community of the supplicandus (the 

hypothesis of Walter Burkert). What is more, he argues that there is no 

necessary contradiction between supplication as a practice and its legal 

regulation: for the norms that govern a suppliant’s approach to the 

supplicandus (or to an altar or other stand-in), the gestures and verbal 

appeals the suppliant may make, and the suppliant’s petition and 

accompanying arguments—these being the first three steps of the 

supplication process—along with, finally, the supplicandus’ evaluation of 

the plea and decision whether or not to honor it, may all be subject to 

legal formalization without eo ipso compromising the nature of the 

transaction as a supplication.



N. is right, in my view, and his book, which is a major scholarly 

achievement, will now be the standard study of supplication in classical 

antiquity. Take supplicatory gestures (step 2): based on a careful 

tabulation of a huge number of examples, drawn from literary texts, 

inscriptions and images, N. reports that clasping the knees occurs in only 

a quarter of the personal supplications described by Herodotus, Thucydides 

and Diodorus Siculus (p. 45), although literary descriptions tend to dwell 

on this act (p. 46). Roman sources, in turn, rarely mention knee-clasping, 

and in supplications to Romans “only foreign suppliants kneel” (p. 50). 

Words may replace gestures, when the occasion requires: Odysseus could not 

very well clasp the knees of Nausicaa when he stood naked before her, but 

he is nevertheless supplicating. In addition, suppliants normally attempt 

to bolster their case with reasons; as N. writes: “Of all parts of an act 

of supplication, arguments best rebut the view that supplication is a 

ritual of contact” (p. 78). Just as merit is essential to the Greek emotion 

of pity, so too suppliants must show that they merit consideration; hence, 

in Greek supplications, the suppliant always protests innocence. Arguments 

may appeal to reciprocity, threats, kinship ties, fairness or pity, this 

last a recourse more common among women and children than adult males.



Once the merits of a case have been presented, whether implicitly or 

explicitly, the supplicandus must respond (step 4). If the request is 

granted, according to N., “the two of them enter into a lasting tie” (p. 

105; cf. p. 129). Here I must register a disagreement. As N. shows, the 

“tie” is simply the obligation to live up to the supplicandus’ pledge to 

the suppliant: to spare her or his life, for example. This may be done at 

once, and the suppliant sent packing (pp. 119–22); there is no 

incorporation into the group, whether as xenos or philos, and no bond 

arises. Of course, a suppliant may petition for citizenship, or for 

long-term protection; if the request is granted, a tie is established. But 

this consequence has nothing to do with the nature of supplication itself. 

I fear the notion of a bond between suppliant and consenting supplicandus 

is a holdover from Burkert’s view. But the important point is that 

rejection of a petition is perfectly ordinary, irrespective of contact 

between the parties. Acceptance or rejection, in turn, is not arbitrary, 

but involves reasons, stated or not (the most common reason for rejection 

is that the petitioner is in the wrong). Thus, rejection is virtually never 

punished (p. 146), as one might have expected if it were considered a 

violation of ritual obligation.



N. next shows how legal regulations interacted with traditional practices 

of supplication, devoting one chapter to Greece, a second to Rome. Here he 

examines, among other questions, the function of magistrates and the 

courts, and the rules for supplication at shrines (whether under the 

control of particular cities or international—again, expulsion of the 

suppliant was by no means uncommon). N. points to fundamental differences 

between Greek and Roman practices, identifying three principal Roman 

“innovations—the imperium of the magistrate, mercy, and the provision of 

rights” (p. 220). Roman magistrates, whether in a civilian or military 

capacity, had powers that enabled them to decide independently whether to 

accept a suppliant’s appeal, whereas Greek magistrates had no comparable 

authority: the Athenian strategoi, for example, had no right to punish, and 

hence to spare, a soldier, as a Roman general could (p. 225). By “mercy,” 

N. renders clementia, and he argues that “[t]he Romans differed from the 

Greeks in allowing a suppliant to admit his own guilt and ask for mercy” 

(p. 240). Clementia, according to N., was an option for the Roman 

supplicandus in addition to granting pardon (dare veniam, ignoscere) or 

sparing (parcere) a suppliant: “The difference between clementia and pity 

is ethical. Clementia is for the pardonable suppliant, pity for the 

deserving one” (p. 243). This is not entirely accurate. Clementia differs 

fundamentally from pity in that pity is an emotion (you feel it), whereas 

clementia is a character trait (you possess it). Thus, clementia came to be 

identified as one of the main virtues of the emperor, and was never seen as 

a sign of condescension (contra N., p. 247), though pity might be. In 

Greek, the analogous trait to clementia is philanthrôpia or epieikeia 

(Aristotle gives the latter a peculiar sense in the Nicomachean Ethics, 

tangential to its ordinary use). If it is true, as N. affirms, that Greek 

suppliants never admit wrongdoing or appeal to the kindness of the 

supplicandus, epieikeia is nevertheless associated by Diodorus Siculus with 

a disposition to pardon (sungnômê, 13.24). But perhaps Diodorus was 

influenced by the Roman ideal of clementia, which was much in the air at 

the time he was writing. Finally, N. shows how certain Roman legal 

institutions, such as appelatio and provocatio, were in the process of 

developing into a conception of rights “that made supplication unnecessary” 

(p. 289).



I have given only the barest outline of N.’s argument. N. writes clearly 

and has a refined feeling for genre and literary context. Occasionally I 

differ with him; for example, when Agamemnon advises Menelaus to kill the 

suppliant Adrastus (Iliad 6.55–60), Homer’s approval may be less a way “to 

endorse the climax of the plot of the Odyssey” (p. 143) and so to unify the 

two epics, than a nod to Agamemnon’s pain at the wounding of his brother by 

Pandarus. But this is to quibble. This is a first-rate book, and 

indispensable to anyone interested in ancient supplication.



DAVID KONSTAN

Brown University





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